1
Non-technical Summary
This paper studies the sensitivity of bank lending to non-financial corporations (NFCs) to bank's capital ratios and their supervisory capital requirements. Our study makes use of an unique dataset for the French banking sector covering the period between 2003 and 2011.
To get a grasp of this sensitivity requires to correctly disentangle credit supply effects from demand-related effects. Therefore, we attempt to explain credit growth to NFCs and see the contribution of bank's capital ratio. Determinants such as the confidential bank-level responses to the Bank Lending Survey are key to single out the true effect of capital ratios on lending to NFCs. However, the relationship between our variables of interest might be more complex. We deepen our analysis by including the discretionary capital requirements set by the French Prudential Supervisory and Resolution Authority. In doing so, we add a new dimension of differentiation between banks, that is, the intensity of the supervisory capital constraint.
Our analysis shows that, on average, additional capital implies a stronger dynamics for credit growth. Moreover, the inclusion of supervisory capital requirements in our framework helps uncover a non-linear effect between lending growth and capital ratios. Indeed, this elasticity crucially depends on the intensity of the supervisory capital constraint. Our results reveal that the more a bank is constrained by its supervisory capital, the less sensitive its credit growth will be with regard to the bank's capital ratio. This has strong implications for the conduct of bank supervision: making the supervisory capital constraint bind has a significant effect on the financing of the real economy as banks will adjust their loan production with less intensity than before.
In equivalent terms, we also find that constrained banks credit dynamics are more responsive to their ratio of non-performing loans (to total loans). As this ratio rises, constrained banks are more prone to slow their lending to NFCs than others.
However, both non-linear effects weaken below or close to the supervisory minimum capital requirement. All these features are robust across various econometric specifications.
1 Introduction 80% of non-financial corporations (NFCs) funding depends on banks in France, to be compared with only a third for the United States (Paris Europlace (2013)), which explains why banks are a crucial element for French firms to make the investments essential to their businesses. The health of the banking sector has been and is under close scrutiny, as exemplified by the Asset Quality Review the European Central Bank and national supervisory authorities are undertaking in 2014.
The evolution of banking regulation spurred by the Third Basel Accord in 2011 and its transposition into European and French law in 2013 triggered a debate over the impact on the real economy. The main policy instrument in the supervisory toolbox is capital ratios. The amount and quality of capital required for micro-prudential purposes has been increased through core equity Tier 1 ratios or the capital conservation buffer for example. Macro-prudential requirements, such as the countercyclical capital buffer, G-SIFIs requirements or the systemic risk buffer even increase the weight of the supervisory constraints.
If banks have to fulfill these capital requirements and manage their balance-sheet accordingly, this could induce them to reshuffle their investments. Some market segments could be privileged over others, depending on their capital costs. The central question of the current debate is then:
how do banks adjust their lending in response to fluctuations in their capital-to-assets ratios? The answer to the question is not straightforward. The elasticity of lending to capital depends on capital costs relative to other sources of funding as well as investor's risk aversions or their returns expectations (see Admati and Hellwig (2013) ).
We propose to participate to this debate by making use of a unique database for the French banking sector between 2003 and 2011 combining bank-level Bank Lending Survey (BLS henceforth) answers with the discretionary capital requirements set by the French Prudential Supervisory and Resolution Authority. Thanks to this database, we can estimate the impact of additional capital (measured by the bank's Tier 1 capital-to-assets ratio) on quarterly credit growth and qualify it with respect to the intensity of the supervisory capital constraint.
We find that on average, in our sample of French banks, more capital means an acceleration of credit. But the elasticity of lending to capital depends on the intensity of the supervisory capital constraint. More supervisory capital-constrained banks' credit growth tend to be less responsive to a higher capital ratio than unconstrained banks. We thus show that making the supervisory constraint bind induces banks to slow their production of loans. We also find that more supervisory capital-constrained banks tend to be more reactive to the ratio of non-performing loans than unconstrained banks. The former are more prone to reduce credit allocation after a rise in these problematic assets than the latter. However, both aforementioned non-linear effects seem to weaken as banks get close or below their supervisory minimum capital requirement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the literature related to our analysis. Section 3 presents a summary of the theory surrounding bank capital and lending. Section 4 takes a look at the data used, which comprise detailed bank-level BLS survey responses as well as individual fine-tuned capital requirements set by the banking supervisor in France. In section 5, we outline our methodology for estimating the link between banks' capital ratio and lending. Section 6 reports our empirical findings and section 7 concludes.
The literature has been intensively examining the effects of capital on lending since the first regulations were defined with Basel I in 1988. But the question has never been under such spotlight before the financial crisis triggered a worldwide regulatory response. From an empirical perspective, the literature has tackled three essential issues. First of all, uncovering the potential effect of capital requires disentangling supply effects from demand effects on bank lending. Secondly, a clear distinction must be made between the various possible capital ratios (regulatory ratio or non-weighted, absolute level or relative level compared to a target for example). Thirdly, the relationship between bank lending and capital might not be linear. In this section, we review these essential issues for our question.
Disentangling loan supply from loan demand
The most problematic issue for isolating the effect of capital on lending is to control for changes in loan demand. Several approaches have been used in the literature, the most common one being to explicitly take into account economic conditions directly linked to loan demand such as GDP growth or similar macroeconomic variables (see for example Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) or Berrospide and Edge (2010) ). Other papers use regional variations of bank health and economic conditions to disentangle supply from demand effects. Bernanke et al. (1991) use simple reducedform loan equations to detect the effect of capital on lending during the credit crunch that took place in New England in 1990. A third solution consists in taking advantage of a natural event that resulted in a shock to banks' capital base without any changes in loan demand. These studies typically focus on multinational banking groups which go through a shock to one of its foreign branches (such in Peek and Rosengren (2000) ) and see how the supply shock in the foreign country affect lending in the home country of the bank.
Finally, several papers tackle the disentangling issue with questions extracted from national bank lending surveys. In the case of the US Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS), several papers use the aggregated responses of banks on their standards to study the effect of credit supply on the fluctuations of the US economy such as Lown et al. (2000) , Lown and Morgan (2006) and Ciccarelli et al. (2010) among others. Most of them build on standard monetary VARs that include these survey responses to better control for supply-side effects but they do not explicitly focus on the impact of bank capital. The Eurozone, with its own Bank Lending Survey (BLS) which started in 2002Q4, also contributes to the literature. Works that make use of the aggregate survey data circumvent the limited size of the sample by working on area-wide panels such as Ciccarelli et al. (2010) or Hempell and Sørensen (2010) . In the literature, only a few papers have taken advantage of the bank-level BLS data. Blaes (2011), Del Giovane et al. (2011) and ?? (Bas) for instance all use bank-level credit data combined with individual responses to the lending survey to study the dynamics of credit in Germany, Italy and the US respectively. So far, the literature has revealed the significant contribution of these bank lending surveys to identify credit supply shocks especially during the financial crisis. 
Observed capital ratios and regulatory capital requirements
In general, one would presume that the minimum capital requirements affect banks' observed capital ratios and subsequently lending. This issue has been studied in the past in the regulation impact analysis literature. AIYAR et al. (2014) test if changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks and whether unregulated substitute sources of credit are able to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks. They use time-varying bank-specific minimum capital requirements imposed by UK regulators. They find that regulated banks decrease lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. Francis and Osborne (2012) find that capital requirements affect banks' desired capital ratio. They show that the potential gap between the actual and desired ratio have significant consequences on bank lending. More recently, Brun et al. (2013) analyze the consequences of capital requirements on bank lending using loan-level data and the transition from Basel I to Basel II. They find a strong negative effect of capital requirements on lending.
Some papers also focused on observed capital ratios and find a positive relationship between capital and lending. Berrospide and Edge (2010) , Carlson et al. (2013) The link between capital and lending seems to be non-linear according to recent empirical research. Jiménez et al. (2012) find highly capitalized banks are less prone to lend to new borrowers but the sign is reversed if interactions with macroeconomic variables are considered in the regression. Carlson et al. (2013) show the capital ratio has a more significant impact on lending when it is already low than when it is high. The significance also depends on the type of loans considered. These results corroborate those found by Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) capital position had a significant negative impact on lending during the Lehman crisis. They argue a higher capital ratio positively influences lending indirectly through its interaction with asset quality and the funding structure so that there's not a straight linear relationship between these two variables of interest.
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Why and how would equity capital (capital in general by extension) impact credit growth? It depends both on the rationale for holding capital and on capital market characteristics.
Economic and Regulatory Capital
Banks hold capital because either they think it is optimal (economic capital) or because supervisors or the market want them to do so (regulatory capital). Equity capital represents the part of unborrowed funds available for a bank that can be used to finance its investments. The amount of capital is determined by bankers under the framework of their portfolio management strategy.
This 'voluntarily held' equity does not have an obvious impact on credit growth. Increasing equity in absolute terms allows the expansion of the balance sheet, so it can result in higher credit supply, ceteris paribus. If the banker increases its ratio of equity to assets, it may be to fit its funding mix to new asset classes, especially their liquidity and maturity characteristics. So it can be associated with an increase for some credit categories and a decrease for others.
When equity capital stems from the banker's optimization problem, its impact depends on the production function and risk aversion of the bank. But external constraints, due either to the supervisor or market forces, disrupts the asset allocation desired by the bank. If the capital level is not already high enough to fulfill the requirements, the bank has to raise equity. However, providing equity may be more costly than other forms of funding. As a consequence, banks would attempt to shrink the size of their balance sheet, hence the amount of assets and certainly credit if all asset classes are affected uniformly.
Thus, regulatory capital could shrink credit growth while economic capital has an uncertain effect on the latter. The size and direction of these effects depend on two conditions: the relevancy of the capital structure and the specificity of capital as a funding instrument (see table 2).
Modigliani-Miller Propositions
The Proposition I of Modigliani-Miller (M&M henceforth, Modigliani and Miller (1958) ) states the irrelevance of the capital structure on the value of the firm and on its funding cost while Proposition II shows that equity cost rises with leverage. However, M&M has been a hotly-debated issue among academics and bankers alike on its application in the banking sector in contrast with other industries. If M&M applies in the case of banks, the share of equity in the funding mix should not be a source of concern for credit growth. Miller (1995) answers whether the M&M's propositions apply to banks and he replies with a very short abstract: "Yes and no.", thus emphasizing the complexity of the question.
Indeed, Proposition I theoretically holds with no taxation and no market imperfections. But banks' existence is the very result of information asymmetries (between the lender and the borrower) and they suffer themselves from agency issues (between the shareholder and the manager, see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) ). Moreover, deposit insurance and taxation also create distortions. All these elements entail the failure of M&M's Proposition I about the irrelevancy of capital structure. In such situations, funding costs may then depend on the funding mix because tax rules that favor debt over equity prevail for example. When both propositions fail, a bank can leverage up without equity being more costly. In this case, switching to a higher share of equity in the capital structure would deprive the bank of cheaper financing such as deposits or wholesale funding and it would most likely lead it to cut credit.
However, a more realistic framework would not necessarily entail the failure of Proposition II, which states that, with or without taxes, equity costs rise with leverage as risk in the bank would increase and investors would want to be adequately compensated for the riskiness of their potential investments in the bank.
1 So raising the equity share of the capital structure would decrease its marginal cost, offsetting a part of the structural higher cost of equity financing. In such setting, the impact of more capital on credit is not clear-cut. Table 2 : Theoretical effect of a higher share of equity capital on lending
The paper tries to uncover the variations induced by the level of capital in general on lending growth while taking into account the binding or non-binding aspect of capital constraint.
Data

Balance-sheet data
We extract balance-sheet data from banks' quarterly reports to the French Prudential Supervisory and Resolution Authority. Overall, our sample represents around 64% of all bank assets (see appendix A.1). Table 3 shows some summary statistics of the explaining variables used in the sections of this paper. It shows that the average actual Tier 1 capital-to-assets ratio (CAT 1) in our sample is quite high at 6%. The average ratio of non-performing loans (N P L) is low.
Our main variable of interest is credit granted to NFCs. More precisely, we consider the sum of every credit type granted to NFCs: liquidity, export, housing, commercial, equipment, account receivable. As it is usually done in the banking sector, only credit outstanding amounts are reported. Due to the length of loan contracts, the reported amounts can be the outcome of deals made many periods before. To remove part of this inertia and in order to get closer to new credit activity (which is believed to be influenced by banks' capital position), we actually consider the quarterly growth rate of credit granted to NFCs in the rest of our paper. 2 According to table 1 See Admati and Hellwig (2013) for a discussion.
2 We argue this approach allows to get closer to credit activity during the period observed, though it is still plagued by the well-known shortcoming that changes in loan stocks also reflect write-offs, exchange-rate effects, reporting changes etc. 
Bank Lending Survey data
The European Central Bank has been conducting the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) since 2002Q4
actually.
3 It consists in a set of questions with categorical answers filled every quarter by individual banks in the Euro area. 4 The survey provides information on the supply and demand conditions they face, by loans and counterparty types. The banks' sample for each country is chosen by the national central bank to get representative information on developments in credit standards, non-interest rate credit conditions and terms, risk perception of banks and the willingness of banks to lend with both a backward-and forward-looking perspective. For our empirical assessment, we restrict the sample to a panel of 13 banks, queried in the survey from 2003Q1 to 2011Q4.
5 Table 4 presents detailed statistics on the main responses on standards given by French banks 3 The Bank Lending Survey sampling and time period coverage defines our own sample. We did not have access to the data corresponding to 2002Q4. The period 2003-2011 is characterized by both the transition from Basel I to Basel II and the crisis period. These structural breaks are tested in an econometric framework.
4 See Berg et al. (2005) for a complete description. 5 Three banks in our sample stopped being questioned a few quarters before 2011Q4 for the BLS.
in the BLS. Similar to the features found in the BLS results for other Euro-area countries (Del Giovane et al. (2011) for Italy or Blaes (2011) for Germany), French banks' answers do not often differ from the recurrent "basically unchanged". We also notice the fifth categorical response is almost non-existant. over most of the sample period in France, using Cumu BLS D i,t might lead us to the wrong conclusion that demand is negatively correlated with credit growth for example. This apparently suggests that the banks' assessments on demand should be interpreted in terms of "acceleration"
and "deceleration", rather than "increase" and "decrease". Thus, from now on, we will instead only consider BLS S i,t and BLS D i,t in the rest of the paper.
Capital requirements
Pillar I of the Basel II accord requires banks to maintain at all times a minimum of Tier 1 capital equal to 4% of risk-weighted assets (RWA). The second Pillar provides a framework for the supervisor to determine the soundness of a bank. Based on a thorough assessment of the institution's activities and risk profile, the supervisor can require the bank to hold a higher level of capital than the minimum legal requirement of Pillar I. This additional buffer, determined each year at the French banking supervisor's discretion, constitutes the key variable of interest in our paper. Notice that the French banking supervisor has been making use of this strategy well before the official implementation of Basel II in France.
The average total regulatory requirement (regarding Tier 1 capital) between 2003 and 2012 for our banks sample has been above the legal minimum of 4%. For the period 2003-2006, the additional requirement was more or less stable. It increased during the following years until reaching in 2010 a peak. These supervisory requirements vary in the cross-sectional dimension but vary only gradually through time for a given bank.
The difference between the observed ratio and individual total discretionary requirements 7 is on average strictly positive. Actually, some banks even have an effective solvency ratio way above the supervisor's requirement. Since 2009, whereas supervisory requirements are increasing, buffers are on average bigger than their beginning of period level. This may denote market discipline pressure.
For the sample gathered here, banks with a solvency ratio below the supervisory requirement are an exception. Concluding that the supervisor has no efficient pressure here on banks would be missing the point. Such a strict definition does not account for potential anticipations. Repullo and Suarez (2013) show that banks may even prefer benefit from a buffer above regulatory requirements so as to be able to lend as much as desired in the subsequent periods. Maintaining a buffer just enough to be above the supervisor's requirement might reflect continuous supervisor's pressure as well as the bank's internally desired path of conduct.
Macroeconomic data
To take into account aggregate demand, we consider the quarterly growth of nominal investment by NFCs (d Investment). Eonia will be considered to control for monetary policy.
Methodology
Reduced Form Equation
We want to estimate the impact of a variation in the capital ratio on the growth rate of NFCs loans. Ideally, we would estimate a credit supply equation. However, we cannot ignore the simultaneity bias the estimation would suffer from. Therefore, we turn to the BLS survey to find a demand shifter and introduce a reduced form equation in which the parameter of interest is the coefficient β that follows:
∆y i,t denotes the quarterly growth rate of credit to NFCs granted by bank i between quarter t and t − 1. The variable is the sum of every credit type granted to NFCs: liquidity, export, housing, commercial, equipment, account receivable.
We consider the prudential definition of funds for solvency purposes. The variable of interest is the amount of eligible Tier 1 Capital (namely "original own funds"). This is the sum of eligible capital, eligible reserves and funds for general banking risks. 8 CAT 1 is the ratio of this quantity to total assets. 9 To correct for the endogeneity bias due to accounting relationships between the asset and the liability sides of the balance sheet, we consider the first lag of CAT 1.
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X i,t denotes a set of control variables. At the bank level, we include the BLS categorical variables about credit standards (BLS S i,t ) and demand (BLS D i,t ). Non-performing loans (N P L)
are also included to control for bank risk. At the macroeconomic level, we control for economic activity with NFCs quarterly nominal investment growth (d Investment) and monetary policy (Eonia). λ t is a time dummy, q t a seasonal dummy and µ i a bank fixed effect.
Capital and Capital Requirements
In order to test for the non-linearity induced by supervisory capital requirements in the relationship between capital and credit growth, we use the following variable:
Buf f er i,t = bank ratio i,t − supervisor requirements i,t
where supervisor requirements stands for the individual Pillar II total discretionary capital requirement required by the supervisor and bank ratio i,t the ratio effectively reached by the bank on a consolidated basis, 11 below or above the total supervisory requirement. By doing so, we implicitly assume that the larger the difference between economic and required capital, the looser the By analyzing bank supervisor's reports on the Pillar II surcharge, it seems the French Prudential and Resolution Authority tends to favor a minimum 50-bp buffer, meaning a lower level is almost equivalent to no buffer at all for supervisors. Using this judgmental criterion, we thus single out this 50-bp threshold for Buf f er i,t above which banks might be less constrained by the supervisor. Combining this qualitative and quantitative threshold with M ax(Buf f er i,t ), we split the distribution of Buf f er i,t along three segments, two of which, above 50 bps, are of identical lengths. Doing so, we can define three dummy variables for each observation being in a given segment, which will constitute the basis for three different groups of banks. Precisely, we build, with s i the point defining the cut-off point between the i th and i + 1 th segment, 12 the three following groups of banks:
We also build the interactions between these dummies and CAT 1. Doing so, we can augment our baseline specification and estimate (β j ) j=1,2,3 in :
The different groups defined above reflect the scale of supervisory constraint faced by banks in the sample. For instance, banks belonging to group A could be qualified as "weakly/undercapitalized" as they barely or do not meet supervisory requirements. Being in this group means these banks will be subject to frequent on-site inspections and prompt corrective actions which will require them to restrict asset growth, submit a capital restoration plan etc. Thus, group-A banks are subject a priori to an intense supervisory constraint. Banks belonging to group B may be viewed as "adequately capitalized" and they will be less likely subject to frequent inspections and corrective actions. Finally, banks in group C could be qualified as "well capitalized" as they far exceed the supervisory minimum requirement and therefore enjoy a higher degree of freedom in their activities in contrast with group A. Group C of the distribution of Buf f er will be our reference group from now on. We also test analogous specifications with the interactions for N P L, the ratio of non-performing loans to the total amount of loans granted.
Estimation Method
We estimate the equations with a fixed-effect (µ i ) panel data estimation procedure. We select the lag order of our control variables with the usual BIC criterion. As the Pillar-II capital surcharges are set once a year by the supervisor in France, we posit that the implied supervisory constraint may affect the bank with a lag of a few quarters, which will be determined from the value of the information criterion.
Since the Bank Lending Survey has a sample of institutions selected on a solo basis while prudential equity capital is a group-wide measure, we have to correct for correlation between individuals that are part of the same consolidated entity. 13 We do so by basing inference on a 12 A slightly lower or higher s 2 does not change our overall results. 13 For example, teams within a same banking group compete to get the largest capital allocation for their activities.
group-clustered estimator of the variance-covariance matrix (Wooldridge (2003) ).
14 Our panel is unbalanced, because of concentration dynamics in the French banking sector.
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Bank balance-sheet datasets often contain a significant number of outlier observations reflecting mergers & acquisitions (M&A) or other structural changes in a bank structure or a statistical break. With the help of information provided by the French banking supervisor, we list 32 outlier observations, 7 of them corresponding to M&A operations and the rest to take into account a structural break for one bank in the sample. 16 Moreover, we had to combine bank data originating from two different databases of the French supervisor. Thus, we take this into consideration in our analysis by creating a dummy variable for the aforementioned structural break and that equals 1 at each M&A event or at each period that makes use of a different bank database (Data quality dummy). We also control for a crisis dummy in some of our specifications, which is equal to 1 from 2008q3 onwards.
6 Empirical results The coefficient of the variable of interest CAT 1 is always significant at the 5% level and varies only little from one specification to another. According to our baseline result, raising the ratio of Tier 1 own funds to the size of the balance sheet by 1 ppt leads, ceteris paribus, to a rise in credit growth by 1 ppt approximately. We here capture that banks with a higher capitalization will spur a more dynamic credit supply. This result is not unsettling in itself as a good chunk of our sample covers the upward part of the French credit cycle.
Capital Requirements and Economic Capital
In practice, a positive shock to CAT 1 could be implemented through 3 different ways:
• increasing the amount of Tier 1 capital (total assets being held constant),
• decreasing the amount of total assets (Tier 1 capital being held constant),
• Tier 1 capital increasing faster (or decreasing slower) than total assets.
Results presented in Table 5 point to a specific behavior of banks. In the first and third case, the bank has at disposal a greater share of capital (i.e. more unborrowed funds) which will allow it to supply more credit. Our regression reflects that feature. In the second case, the bank begins by shedding assets, leading to a higher share of capital compared to assets in the balance sheet, everything else held constant. Our results show that the bank re-accelerates its production of loans. In the light of table 5, the three cases indicate that French banks actively manage their balance sheets and their leverage. This feature echoes the work of Adrian and Shin (2010) on US 14 In the end, the estimation finds 8 clusters in our sample. 15 We are subject to the survivor bias to the extent that the selection process is not independent from the error term, given all regressors. See Baltagi and Song (2006) . 16 The surveyed bank switched to another branch of the consolidated group. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table  5 : Reduced form credit equation -Baseline specifications. {BLS S i,t = BLS S Eased i,t = −1}, {BLS D i,t = BLS D Decrea i,t = −1} are taken as the reference groups for the BLS variables. commercial banks, which are found to have dynamically managed their assets and liabilities in order to maintain a constant leverage ratio.
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Regarding control variables, columns (1) and (2) 17 turns out to be close to significativity and manages to capture some variability in our data as the coefficients of BLS D become less significant. The time dummies in column (3) seem to wholly capture aggregate credit demand in the end. This probably reflects the lack of variance of loan demand at the individual level in our sample.
Turning to the supply side, the BLS responses related to credit standards are found to be significant at the 5% threshold with negative coefficients, i.e. tightened credit standards are associated with slower lending growth. Our results show again their high explanatory power and their relevance as in Del Giovane et al. (2011) . 18 However, our proxy for the monetary stance in the Euro area (column (2)) turns out to have a significant positive effect on NFCs credit growth,
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which seems at first sight surprising given that the higher financing cost for banks should translate into higher prices for NFCs and therefore a fall in demand. As in Francis and Osborne (2012) who found the same feature in the UK, our result can still be interpreted in two ways. First, policymakers may take into account bank credit when they are setting the monetary stance, and hence strong credit growth may trigger increases in the policy rate, which then take time to act on demand for credit. As a second explanation, we can envisage that, while increases in interest rates may reduce demand for credit, this change may actually result in firms becoming more dependent on banks, if an increase in the policy rate makes the access to disintermediated financing more difficult for firms (e.g. the reduction of informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders by banks becomes more relevant during periods of tight monetary conditions, in contrast with market financing).
We fail to uncover any significant effects of the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans on credit growth with the basic specifications. Table 6 allows the effect of the CAT 1 ratio to vary with the bank group the observation belongs to. The interaction variables have been introduced with one lag in order to reflect the lagged effect of supervisory action on the bank's risk management. We find again the same significant positive effect of CAT 1 on credit growth at the 5% level. But it is now higher, as it reflects the impact of CAT 1 in our reference group, that is, group C (the third segment of Buf f er). Results on the interactions of the CAT 1 ratio with the group dummies show that the more stringent the supervisory constraint, the lower the effect of higher capital on credit growth. These results can be explained by the fact that the supervisory body limits the response of banks to an improvement of its capital ratio.
17 Adding or replacing it by the change in inventories at NFCs do not change anything to our results. 18 Costs of funds and the capital position are potential factors behind the answers given to the lending standards evolution by bankers to the BLS. They are indeed explanatory items suggested by the questionnaire itself. So entering both the capital ratio and the lending standards variable from the BLS could entail double counting of the information related to capital. To make sure our estimation does not suffer from this bias, we constructed a synthetic indicator of lending standards factors answers to the BLS, excluding costs of funds and balance-sheet constraints. It left the results unchanged for CAT 1.
19 Using another interest rate such as the Euribor 3M does not change our results. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table  6 : Non-linearity induced by the supervisory constraint. {BLS S i,t = BLS S Eased i,t = −1}, {BLS D i,t = BLS D Decrea i,t = −1} are taken as the reference groups for the BLS variables and group C for the dummy-based variables.
closest to their supervisory minimum and so supposedly under intense supervisory pressure does not have an influence on the association between the capital ratio and NFCs credit growth. Moreover, we can deduce from Table 6 that the coefficients of CAT 1 * Group A and CAT 1 * Group B are not significantly different. All in all, when looking at group C on the one hand and banks of group A and B combined on the other, our empirical results show that as a bank is more and more constrained by the supervisor, its response to an improvement in the capital ratio in terms of credit growth will be lower. We would like to stress that our present results reflect banks' behavior throughout the credit cycle.
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We refrain from commenting the results on the segment dummies themselves, since they only alter the coefficient of the constant. Results for the control variables are similar to those obtained in table 5.
Specifications that take into account the serial correlation of the dependent variable are presented in the appendix (table B.1) and confirms the previous qualitative results.
Capital Requirements and Non-Performing Loans
In this section, we test whether capital requirements induce non-linearity through another important risk-related variable than capital itself. We focus here on the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans granted, N P L as showed in table 7. Both the capital ratio CAT 1 and N P L are standard riskmetrics and deeply linked together as rising non-performing loans may lead to the depletion of bank capital. Moreover, non-performing loans in the asset portfolio are automatically applied a 150% risk weight, which then calls for higher capital requirements. As the previous specifications did not reveal any significant linear impact of N P L despite its importance as a standard bank riskmetric, this section thus attempts to uncover any potential non-linear effects of N P L on credit growth.
In line with our baseline set-up in table 5, the ratio of non-performing loans is not significantly related to credit growth in the reference group (group C). In a similar way to the capital ratio, we show a higher significant negative effect as you move down across the groups of banks. This suggests that supervisory capital requirements induce the bank to be more cautious in their credit allocation, i.e. credit growth will be more responsive to non-performing loans if their share becomes too important. The estimated coefficient for group A is not always significant (see column (3) of table 7) and seems to point to the same phenomenon near the supervisory minimum requirement as for the capital ratio CAT 1. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table 7 : Non-performing loans and capital requirements. {BLS S i,t = BLS S Eased i,t = −1}, {BLS D i,t = BLS D Decrea i,t = −1} are taken as the reference groups for the BLS variables and group C for the dummy-based variables.
confidential supervisory data on discretionary capital buffers required by the French supervisor to study the impact of capital requirements on credit growth, through both capital itself and the reaction to non-performing loans.
We show that supervisory capital requirements induce non-linearity in the reaction of credit growth to the share of capital with which a bank is funded. If on average, in our sample of French banks, we find that more capital means an acceleration of credit to non-financial corporations, this result must be viewed through the lenses of the intensity of supervisory requirements, measured as the difference between regulatory and economic capital. More supervisory capital-constrained banks' credit growth tend to be less responsive to a higher capital ratio than unconstrained banks.
We thus show that supervisory capital is indeed a lever to curb lending.
Moreover, we show that this non-linearity is also present with the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans granted while no linear effect is detected. More supervisory capital constrained banks tend to be more reactive to this ratio than unconstrained banks. The former are more prone to reduce credit allocation after a rise in non-performing loans than the latter.
However, both aforementioned non-linear effects seem to weaken below or close to the supervisory minimum capital requirement.
This variation of the impact of both capital and non-performing loans with the intensity of A Sample's representativity Table B .1 takes into account the serial correlation of the dependent variable. These autoregressive models are also estimated with a standard fixed-effect routine following Judson and Owen (1999) results on panel with the time dimension larger than the cross-sectional one. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table B .1: Robustness checks : AR specifications. {BLS S i,t = BLS S Eased i,t = −1}, {BLS D i,t = BLS D Decrea i,t = −1} are taken as the reference groups for the BLS variables and group C for the dummy-based variables. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table B .2: Non-performing loans and serial correlation for credit growth. {BLS S i,t = BLS S Eased i,t = −1}, {BLS D i,t = BLS D Decrea i,t = −1} are taken as the reference groups for the BLS variables and group C for the dummy-based variables.
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